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Klein v. City of Yonkers: A PENUMBRA OF UNCERTAINTY
CHARLES E. ROBERTS*
[A]ll rules have a penumbra of uncertainty where the judge
must choose between alternatives.
-H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
The timeliness of tort actions against municipalities in New
York has been a subject of much legislative and judicial activity in
recent years.1 The stakes are high-the exposure of municipalities
to serious liability-and the policy choices often pit the need for
equitable treatment of an injured person against the legislative ob-
ligation to guard the public purse. General Municipal Law section
50-i was conceived as a means of establishing some uniformity in
this area of the law2 by affording a plaintiff with a personal injury
or property damage claim against a municipality one year and
ninety days in which to commence his action after the "happening
of the event upon which the claim is based."3 The courts have
* The author is Law Secretary to the Hon. Howard A. Zeller, Justice of the Supreme
Court in Madison County, and Administrative Judge of the Sixth Judicial District. The
author wishes to thank Professor Samuel J. M. Donnelly of the Syracuse University College
of Law, Edward B. Flink, Esq., an associate with Hinman, Howard & Kattell in Bingham-
ton, New York, and Joseph Zagraniczny, an associate with Bond, Schoeneck & King for
their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See text at notes 40-52 infra.
2. Governor's Memorandum on Approving L. 1959 c. 788 § 2 (McKinney's 1959 Session
Laws of New York at 1773).
3. No action or special proceeding shall be prosecuted or maintained against a
city, county, town, village, fire district or school district for personal injury,
wrongful death, or damage to real or personal property alleged to have been
sustained by reason of the negligence or wrongful act of such city, county, town,
village, fire district or school district or of any officer, agent or employee thereof,
including volunteer firemen of any such city, county, town, village, fire district or
school district or any volunteer firemen whose services have been accepted pur-
suant to the provisions of section two hundred nine-i of this chapter, unless, (a)
a notice of claim shall have been made and served upon the city, county, town,
village, fire district or school district in compliance with section fifty-e of this
chapter, (b) it shall appear by and as an allegation in the complaint or moving
papers that at least thirty days have elapsed since the service of such notice and
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struggled to implement the legislative intent behind this provision
while still being sensitive to the equities of the facts before them,
and the result has been mixed interpretations of the statute.'
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Klein v. City of
Yonkers s is a recent example of this conflict. This article will ana-
lyze Klein's application of section 50-i by examining the statute's
text, context, and legislative history,' and will conclude that the
court missed the meaning of section 50-i7 and that the decision
should be rectified by legislative action."
I. KLEIN V. CITY OF YONKERS
The plaintiff in Klein alleged that in 1964 the City of Yonkers
inspected an apartment building and issued a certificate of occu-
pancy to the owner;' that plaintiff purchased the building in Feb-
ruary, 1969 allegedly in reliance upon the certificate;10 and that the
that adjustment or payment thereof has been neglected or refused, and (c) the
action or special proceeding shall be commenced within one year and ninety
days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based; except that
wrongful death actions shall be commenced within two years after the happening
of the death.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-i subd. 1 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1981). General Municipal Law
§ 50-e subd. I requires that the notice of claim be served "within ninety days after the claim
arises." Section 50-i's limitation period is a statute of limitations, while § 50-e's notice pe-
riod is a condition precedent to bringing an action. Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School
District, 51 N.Y.2d 256, 258-259, 264, 414 N.E.2d 639, 640-41, 644, 434 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139,
142 (1980).
4. See text at notes 40-48 infra.
5. 53 N.Y.2d 1011, 425 N.E.2d 865, 442 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1981).
6. This approach is based upon Judge Breitel's belief that statutory construction must
"be effected with full commitment to legislative intent and purpose, in so far as it is deter-
minable, from text, context, and legislative history." Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 27 (Paulsen ed. 1958).
7. The reader will note the author's acknowledged bias against the court's holding in
several parts of this article.
8. A proposed revision of section 50-i is presented in the conclusion of this Article.
9. Any multiple residence built after July 1, 1952 cannot be occupied until it is in-
spected and granted a certificate of occupancy by the local enforcement official. N.Y. MULT.
RESI. LAW § 302 subd. 1, 2 (McKinney 1974); Report of Joint Legislative Comm. on Hous-
ing and Multiple Dwellings (1952), printed in N.Y. MULT. RESIn. LAW (McKinney) at xxi.
10. N.Y. MuLT. REsin. LAW § 302 subd. 5 (McKinney 1974) provides as follows:
A certificate of [occupancy] ... may be relied upon by every person who in good
faith purchases a multiple dwelling or who in good faith lends money upon the
security of a mortage covering such a dwelling. Whenever any such person has so
relied upon such a'certificate, no claim that such dwelling had not, prior to the
issuance of such certificate, conformed in all respects to the provisions of this
chapter shall be made against such person or against the interest of such person
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building was destroyed by fire on January 15, 1973. Plaintiff
claimed the certificate had been negligently issued since the build-
ing did not conform to the filed plans or to city ordinances, and
contained defective fire stops.11
Plaintiff commenced an action against the city on March 13,
1974. The city moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
"happening of the event" upon which the claim wag based was the
issuance of the certificate, and that more than one year and ninety
days had elapsed before the action was brought. Plaintiff argued
the event was the fire, and that his action, commenced fourteen
months later, was timely. Special Term denied the city's motion"2
but was reversed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, 3
which found the event was the issuance of the certificate. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint per curiam over an intense dissent by Judge
Meyer. 4
A. The Text of Section 50-i
The result in Klein turned upon the answer to a deceptively
simple question: what was the event upon which plaintiff's claim
was based? The court dismissed the need for any detailed consid-
eration of the meaning of section 50-i, stating that the "plain lan-
guage" of the statute allowed but one interpretation and it was not
the court's role to change it. 15
Is the meaning of "event" really as clear as the majority sug-
gests? In everyday usage an event is an occurrence or happening,
often an important one.' 6 Its legal meaning is somewhat hazy; the
in a multiple dwelling to which such a certificate applies or concerning which
such a statement has been issued.
11. The complaint's first cause of action was for negligent issuance of the certificate
and the second cause of action alleged fraudulent issuance of the certificate. Only the negli-
gence cause of action was discussed by the Court of Appeals. Klein v. City of Yonkers, 53
N.Y.2d 1011, 425 N.E.2d 865, 442 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1981).
12. Klein v. City of Yonkers, No. 75-10586 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, filed Feb. 16,
1979) (Gagliardi, J.).
13. 73 A.D.2d 931, 423 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't 1980).
14. Klein v. City of Yonkers, 53 N.Y.2d 1011, 425 N.E.2d 865, 442 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1981).
15. Id. at 1013, 425 N.E.2d at 865, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
16. The SHORTER OXFoRm ENGLISH DICTIONARY 642 (3d ed.) defines event first as part of
the phrase "in the event of;" second, as an incident or occurrence, especially an important
one; third, in its meaning as one possible outcome of many in the doctrine of chances; then
as one of the items in a sports program; and finally as the outcome or issue of a course of
1981]
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word is not defined in section 50-i, but has been defined as the act
which causes an injury, the injury itself, and the entire cause and
effect sequence. 17 "Event," however, generally connotes the culmi-
nation or end of a series of acts.18
Event by itself is thus a grey word shaded slightly toward the
climax rather than the inception of an activity, but which, like
many words, takes on the hue of its surroundings. Indeed it is the
nature of language that words are relative and have no set sense,
deriving their meaning from context.19 The assertion that a word's
meaning is clear often bars analysis rather than concludes it, and
discourages an examination of the very factors that must be
checked to see if the clarity is true.2 °
proceedings.
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 287 states that an event is "something
that happens," an archaic meaning is "outcome," and a synonym is "effect."
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 654-55 (4th ed. 1968).
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 498 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines an event as "(t]he conse-
quence of anything; the issue or outcome of an action as finally determined; that in which
an action, operation, or series of operations, terminates. Noteworthy happening or occur-
rence. Something that happens."
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 423 (3d ed. 1969) defines event as "[tihe consequence of
anything; the issue, end, conclusion; that in which an action, operation or series of opera-
tions terminates (Fitch v. Bates (NY) 11 Barb 471, 473). The culmination or end that the
means may have produced or brought about."
19. "It is not true that in practice. . . a given word or even a given collection of
words has one meaning and no other. A word generally has several meanings,
even in the dictionary. You have to consider the sentence in which it stands to
decide which of those meanings it bears in the particular case, and very likely
will see that it then has a shade of significance more refined than any given in
the wordbook."
O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203 (1920).
"All words which are applicable to things, even in the particular context of the circum-
stances in which they are uttered. . . always have many meanings... we are dealing with
sets or groups of meanings, and by meanings I mean particular applications." Curtis, A
Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, in JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION, 139 (1953).
20. Language in a statute which is clear and unambiguous will be applied, the
canons tell us, in accordance with its doubtfree meaning (as if there is such lan-
guage, when the very meaning of the statute has been placed in serious issue). Of
course, this simply means that to the court.-usually only a majority of the
court-its view of the statute's meaning is supported by the literal language in
question.
Breitel, supra note 6, at 23-24.
Judge Breitel further developed this point in New York State Bankers Assn. v. Albright,
38 N.Y.2d 430, 436, 343 N.E.2d 735, 738, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (1975) (cited by the Klein
dissent):
It has been said often, but with less than meticulous analysis, that an
'unambigious' statute permits of no inquiry into legislative intention (citations
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A grey word can be colored by a precise phrase or remain neu-
tral if modified by a general phrase.21 Section 50-i surrounds a grey
word with a grey phrase-"the happening of the event upon which
the claim is based." The event could be fixed at different times in
a case, depending upon one's viewpoint.2 2  In Klein the plaintiff
saw his claim as based upon the fire which caused him damage,
while the city saw the claim as based upon its alleged act of negli-
gence, the issuance of the certificate. The statute does not indicate
whether it intends a plaintiff's, defendant's, or totally different
perspective to control; whether event means an injury, the act that
caused it, or something else. The word is left broad and unlimited.
Without any narrowing or coloring language, an attempt to ascribe
a precise meaning to "event" attributes more particularity than
omitted). Absence of facial ambiguity is, however, rarely, if ever, conclusive. The
words men use are never absolutely certain in meaning; the limitations of finite
man and the even greater limitations of the language see to that. Inquiry into
the meaning of statutes is never foreclosed at the threshold; what happens is
that often the inquiry into intention results in the conclusion that either there is
no ambiguity in the statute, or that for policy or other reasons the prior history
will be rejected in favor of the purportedly explicit statement of the statute (ci-
tation omitted). Then it is often said with more pious solemnity than accuracy,
that the clarity of the statute precludes inquiry into the antecedent legislative
history.
The Supreme Court has pointed out the danger that a court's conclusion regarding legis-
lative purpose:
will be unconsciously influenced by the judge's own views or by factors not con-
sidered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the danger is the best
assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal
interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts available information for
reaching a correct conclusion.
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940)(footnote omitted).
The "clear-statement" model is comprehensively criticized in Note, Intent, Clear State-
ments, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L.
R.v. 892, 899-907 (1982).
21. Words and phrases "have size as well as color and quality. . . . A word can be
adjusted, by the addition of adjectives and qualifying phrases, to cover less or a word can be
selected for its size . . . . This, essentially, is the craft of draftsmanship." Curtis, supra
note 19, at 131, 149.
22. "The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the'... verbal
context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and
experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges).. . . A word
has no meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective meaning, one
true meaning."' Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc., 69
Cal. 2d 33, 38, 442 P.2d 641, 644-45, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564-65 (1968) (Traynor, Ch. J.);
quoting Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parole Evidence Rule, 50 CORNEL
L.Q. 161, 187 (1965).
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the word can bear. It finds modification where there is none. A
reference point beyond the statute's face is needed, and that refer-
ence is the legislative purpose or intent of the statute.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 50-i
The purpose of a statute can be revealed by the record of its
passage,23 but this history must be considered cautiously and criti-
cally, with an eye to the realities of the political process.24 The
black letter of the statute must be the lodestar in this process, oth-
erwise the history could "swallow the legislation so as to give point
to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go
to the statute.
'25
A. A Model of Construction
Like language in general, legislative history and purpose are
best understood in relation to their surroundings. Statutory con-
struction can be compared to an exercise that is learned in gram-
mar school through gritted teeth, the diagramming of sentences.2 8
The central trunk of the statute is the legislative purpose. The
main parts of the text will attach to this purpose at different
points, and various subdivisions and fact situations will branch off
in their turn, like so many subordinate phrases. Each line on this
construction must be identified and its relation to the larger and
smaller lines fixed before a statute's overall meaning, and nuances
in particular cases, will become clear. In short, the statute will
make sense if the diagram fits together.
23. A "page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
24. Breitel, supra note 6, at 30; see generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 137. Justice Frankfurter noted that "[njo item of evidence has a
fixed or even average weight." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, in
LANDMARKS OF LAW 210 (Henson, ed. 1960). Debate on the floor is often equivocal at best.
Id.; see also Breitel, supra note 6, at 30. Sponsors outside of a legislature may issue state-
ments for "all sorts of devious purposes." Id. On the other hand a "painstaking detailed
report by a Senate Committee bearing directly on the immediate question may settle the
matter." Id. at 225. Committee reports may contain hidden motivations, but even so they
are most likely to contain the key reasons for a statute's passage. Breitel, supra note 6, at
30-31.
25. Frankfurter, supra note 24.
26. See R. D. MALLERY, GRAMMAR RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION 75-91 (1960) for a com-
plete discussion and numerous illustrations of sentence diagrams.
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This approach requires the courts to follow what Judge Breitel
has called the rule of "legislative primacy," a focus upon imple-
menting the legislative will.
[It] means total acceptance of the position that statutes are entitled to a con-
struction in accord with legislative purpose. It means reduction of the canons
of construction to tests of validity after the fact of construction. It means
that construction must first be effected with full commitment to legislative
intent and purpose, in so far as it is determinable, from text, context, and
legislative history.
27
Thus, section 50-i's history has meaning not in isolation, but as one
of several factors which indicate how the statute should work.
B. The Joint Legislative Committee Study
The history of section 50-i commences with what preceded
that statute, a disarray of time limitations for tort claims against
municipalities. Over the years numerous statutes had grown up,
each governing claims against one type of municipality.28 The
Joint Legislative Committee on Municipal Tort Liability under-
took a study of the problem 9 and found that tort claims against
municipalities commonly had to be brought within one year, and
could not be commenced until some time after notice had been
given.30 There was no agreement as to when the one year started,
however, and no uniform rule as to when an action could first be
commenced.31 The Committee proposed the basis of today's sec-
tion 50-i as a means of redressing this inconsistency. 2
It appears the Committee intended section 50-i's time period
to commence running on the date of the accident. The study noted
that under General Municipal Law section 50-e an application to
file a late notice of claim:
must be made within the period of one year after the happening of the event
27. Breitel, supra note 6, at 26-27 (footnote omitted).
28. See, e.g., Act of June 4, 1886, ch. 572, § 1, 1886 N.Y. Laws; N.Y. SECOND CLASS
Crrms LAw § 244 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 9801 (McKinney
1981); ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK § 394a-1.0 (1976 & Supp. 1981);
N.Y. CouNTY LAw § 52, subd. 1 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. TOWN LAw § 67 (McKinney 1965).
29. See New York State Legislature, Fifth Report of the Joint Legislative Committee
on Municipal Tort Liability (Legis. Doc. 1959 No. 36) 17, 21, 51-62, [hereinafter cited as the
Report].
30. Id.
31. Id. at 60-61.
32. Id. at 21-22.
19811 543
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upon which the claim is based; i.e., from the time of the accident. It begins to
run, therefore, at the same time as does the one year limitation upon the time
in which an action may be brought.
33
Judge Meyer cited this passage in Klein in support of his dissent,
3
4
while the majority did not discuss this or any other part of the
legislative history. 5
The foregoing statement, made by the bill's sponsor, is persua-
sive but not conclusive evidence as to the meaning of event.3,
However, this phrase was not an extensively or closely considered
point; accident is not defined and the study did not fix the point at
which the period begins in a case of delayed injury. The passage's
effect is further limited by the absence of any equitable discussion
of how, if an injury occurs years after a negligent act, the plaintiff's
right to bring an action should be balanced against a municipal-
ity's need for prompt notice and investigation. 7 The study focused
on curing a problem-the miscellany of limitation commencement
points34-without fully exploring the ramifications of its solution39
33. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
34. 53 N.Y.2d at 1016, 425 N.E.2d at 867, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
35. Additional evidence that the Committee intended the limitation period to com-
mence running upon the accident is provided by a note which precedes the proposed bill.
See Report, supra note 29, at 21. The note cites Christian v. Village of Herkimer, 5 A.D.2d
62, 169 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1958), afl'd, 5 N.Y.2d 818, 155 N.E.2d 122, 181 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1958), in
which a limitation period was commenced upon the accident, even though the action had
not yet accrued. See dissent of McCurn, P.J., 5 A.D.2d at 65, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 81. Christian
is also discussed at length in the body of the study. Report, supra note 29, at 54-55. The
signal placement of Christian preceding the proposed bill and its prominent place in the
study indicates the Committee intended, at least in part, to model the bill upon Christian's
commencement of the period on the date of the accident.
36. See note 24 supra.
37. The problem of issues that were not discussed or not considered by the legislature
is at the heart of much statutory construction. "The fact is that the difficulties of so.called
interpretation arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question
which is raised on the statute never occurred to it; then what the judges have to do is, not to
determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to
guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been
present." J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAW 173 (1963).
38. The study found three different provisions as to when the one year period started:
from the date of the accident, when the cause of action accrued, and from the filing of the
notice of claim. Report, supra note 29, at 61.
39. The study asserted that case law holds that the event upon which a claim is based
is the accrual. Report, supra note 29, at 21. The accrual is the accident. Id. at 61. Thus the
Committee apparently believed that the event, accident and accrual were all simultaneous.
This will not always be true, however, as in cases with a delayed accrual. See, e.g., Cota v.
Madison Cent. School Dist., 89 Misc. 2d 646, 392 N.Y.S.2d 233, aff'd, 62 A.D.2d 1083 (3d
Dept. 1978); Erickson v. Town of Henderson, 30 A.D.2d 282, 291 N.Y.S.2d 403 (4th Dept.
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or the meaning of event. Thus, while the passage is helpful, there
is still a need to examine other sources, such as case law, for their
interpretations of event.
III. DETERMINING THE MEANING OF EVENT
A. Case Law
Judicial opinions regarding section 50-i generally agree with
the Committee that event means accident. In Cota v. Madison
Central School District,40 plaintiff alleged her injuries in a car
crash did not reach the former no-fault $500 threshold until more
than one year and ninety days after the accident. Her action was
dismissed as the court noted, "[t]he Legislature intended the time
limitations for actions under section 50-i of the General Municipal
Law to commence not upon the accrual of plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion, but when the accident occurred. '41 Similarly, in Phillips v.
Waterford, plaintiff wife learned her husband had probably died in
an accident more than one year and ninety days earlier. The court
dismissed her wrongful death claim because of failure to meet the
section 50-i requirement.4  Finally, in Erickson v. Town of Hen-
derson, an administrator was not appointed until more than one
year and ninety days after the death of plaintiff's intestate. 3
Plaintiff's wrongful death action was barred since the period ran
from the "happening of the event causing death.1
44
Commencing the limitation period in these cases on the date
of the accident produced harsh results. The plaintiffs were time-
barred before they could bring an action, either because of lack of
knowledge, standing, or an accrued claim. At least two other courts
have attempted to avoid this problem in cases with compelling
facts, by using a discovery rationale.
1968).
40. 89 Misc. 2d 646, 392 N.Y.S.2d 233. The author assisted in the resolution of Cota
and Correll v. Costello, 94 Misc. 2d 397, 404 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1978), as law secretary to the
justice presiding at Special Term.
41. 89 Misc. 2d at 648; accord, Correll v. Costello, 94 Misc. 2d 397, 398-99 (1978).
42. 48 A.D.2d 745, 368 N.Y.S.2d 313 (3d Dep't 1975).
43. 30 A.D.2d 282, 291 N.Y.S.2d 403 (4th Dep't 1968).
44. Id. at 286. Other cases which have characterized section 50-i's period as running
from the date of the accident include Hahin v. City of Buffalo, 41 Misc. 2d 1018, 246




In Sexstone v. City of Rochester,'45 plaintiff bought an apart-
ment building and commenced an action inter alia against the city
for negligent issuance of a certificate of occupancy. The Appellate
Division found service of the notice of the claim to be timely under
the General Municipal Law, since it was within ninety days after
the violations were discovered. 46 "The running of the ninety day
period should be measured not from the time of the negligent act
but from the date the negligent act produced injury to the plain-
tiffs." Sexstone is distinguishable from Klein in that Sexstone de-
cided when the notice of claim period started, a question of section
50-e, while Klein fixed the period for commencement of the action,
a question of section 50-i.
In Kelly v. City of Rochester, 47 a city fireman was denied acci-
dental disability retirement benefits on the ground he had not
been injured on the job. After three years of pressing his claim and
fruitless requests for information from the state, plaintiff discov-
ered the real reason for the denial was that the city had not filed
the necessary forms on time with the state. The court held plain-
tiff's action against the city was timely brought, measured not from
his accident or the city's error, but from either the date of discov-
ery or of the final denial of his claim.'8
There is no basis in either the text of section 50-i or on its
legislative history to support the use of such a discovery rationale.
The sole justification is an equitable one-in Kelly the court
strained to avoid punishing plaintiff for the state's intransi-
gence-but such a policy has not been reflected in any change in
the statute. The legislature has, however, recently amended section
50-i regarding wrongful death cases.' 9
B. The Wrongful Death Amendment
As a result of this amendment wrongful death actions no
longer need to be commenced within one year and ninety days af-
ter the accident.50 These actions now have a two-year limitation
45. 32 A.D.2d 737, 301 N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dep't 1969).
46. Id.
47. 98 Misc. 2d 435, 413 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1979).
48. Id. at 443-44, citing the discovery rule used in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g.,
Flannagan v. Mt. Eden Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
49. L. 1981 c. 738 § 2 (McKinney's 1981 Session Laws of New York at 1511).
50. See, e.g., Erickson v. Town of Henderson, 30 A.D.2d 282, 291 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1968).
[Vol. 30546
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period, measured from the date of death.51 This change amelio-
rates the result in Erickson and should eliminate most situations
where an estate representative is barred from bringing an action
before he is appointed. 2
The Law Revision Commission proposed the wrongful death
bill5 3 as an exception to the accident standard. The Commission
noted that without the amendment "the time within which to start
a [wrongful] death action would be one year and ninety days from
'the happening of the event,'" which means the happening of the
accident.5 4 The Commission noted that courts construing the
phrase have stated that the legislature intended section 50-i's time
period "'to commence not upon the accrual of plaintiff's cause of
action, but when the accident occurred.' -55 The Commission con-
51. The bill brings section 50-i into conformity with Estates, Powers and Trusts Law §
5-4.1 and the Court of Claims Act § 10(2) which both allow two years from the time of death
in which to commence an action. In addition to creating a uniform statute of limitations for
wrongful death actions, the bill confirms the application of section 50-i to wrongful death
actions. Case law had been divided as to whether such cases were governed solely by the
EPTL limits, or whether section 50-i applied as well. See Priebe v. City of Canandaigua, 91
Misc. 2d 1047, 399 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1977); contra, Erickson v. Town of Henderson, 30 A.D.2d
282, 291 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1968); Phillips v. Village of Waterford, 48 A.D.2d 745, 368 N.Y.S.2d
313 (1975).
52. If the representative is appointed more than two years after death the action will
still be barred as in Erickson.
53. The legislation was originally recommended to the 1979 Legislature by the NEW
YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION. Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1979
at 37, reprinted in McKinney's 1979 Session Laws at 1425, 1437 [hereinafter 1979 Report].
See also MEMORANDUM OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO TIME LIMITATIONS IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, printed in 1979 Report,
supra, reprinted in McKinney's 1979 Session Laws of New York at 1529; RECOMMENDATION
OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO TIME LIMITATIONS IN WRONGFUL DEATH Ac-
TIONS AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, printed in 1979 Report, supra, reprinted in Mc-
Kinney's 1979 Session Laws at 1530. The bills, 1979 Senate No. 2467 and 1979 Assembly
No. 4069, were not reported out of their respective Local Government Committees. Report
of the Law Revision Commission for 1980 at 39.
The Law Revision Commission again proposed the legislation to the 1981 legislature.
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1981, reprinted in McKinney's 1981 Session
Laws at 2235, 2247.
54. MEMORANDUM OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO TIME LIMITATIONS IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, reprinted in Mc-
Kinney's 1981 Session Laws at 2362, 2363 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF THE LAW REVISION
COMM'N].
55. RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO TIME LIMITATIONS
IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, reprinted in Mc-
Kinney's 1981 Session Laws at 2363, 2365, quoting Cota v. Madison Cent. School Dist., 89
Misc. 2d 646, 648, 392 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235 [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW REVI-
SION COM M'N].
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cluded that "[tihis distinction in the starting points for 50-e and
50-i time periods should remain unchanged as they apply to per-
sonal injury actions in view of the conscious legislative intent just
noted. '1 6 However, in wrongful death actions the accident stan-
dard could be "unrealistic" if death were delayed since the period
could run before the claim arose.8 7 Erickson's result, where the pe-
riod expired before an estate representative was appointed, was de-
scribed as "troublesome."5' The Commission acknowledged that
under its proposal if a victim did not die until several years after
an accident, the ability of a municipality to make a timely investi-
gation (the very purpose of section 50-i's limitation) could be frus-
trated.59 This possibility was discounted as a rare occurrence, and
was not seen as significant.60
The Commission's Report contains both "conservative" and
"liberal" elements. The conservative retention of the accident
standard in personal injury cases shows a belief that a line must be
drawn somewhere. The result that some plaintiffs may not be able
to sue because their actions accrue later than their accidents was
accepted as the price of protecting municipalities. On the other
hand, the Commission was willing to abridge the accident standard
where the rule caused a harsh result and the exposure of munici-
palities under the remedy could be controlled.
The Report thus affirms the general use of the accident stan-
dard, even while removing one class of tort actions from that re-
56. RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW REVISION CoMM'N, supra note 55, reprinted in Mc-
Kinney's 1981 Session Laws at 2365. The Commission's distinction between the start of the
period commencing an action and the start of the period for filing a notice of claim cannot
be reconciled with the apparent position of the Joint Legislative Committee that the two are
the same. See note 39 supra. In light of the difference in the language and the possibility of
a delayed accrual after an accident, the Commission's view appears better reasoned. Id.
57. MEMORANDUM OF THE LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 54, reprinted in McKin-
ney's 1981 Session Laws at 2363.
58. RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 55, reprinted in Mc-
Kinney's 1981 Session Laws at 2365.
59. Id. at 2366-67; cf. Cota v. Madison Cent. School Dist., 89 Misc. 2d at 848 ("A plain-
tiff's no-fault charges might not total $500 until several years after the accident; a Statute of
Limitations that could not commence until such a speculative future occurence is hardly the
precise time limit envisioned by the Legislature.").
60. RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 55, reprinted in Mc-
Kinney's 1981 Session Laws at 2367. If the injuries were serious enough to cause a delayed
death, the Commission believed a personal injury action would probably be commenced in
the meantime; also, Court of Claims Act § 10, subd. 3 sets a two-year ceiling on death claims
against the state.
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quirement. The Report recognizes the shortcoming of the accident
standard in a wrongful death action: the event that is truly the
basis for the claim is death, not the accident itself. Finally, the
Report reflects not a bare protectionist policy, but a more balanced
and pragmatic approach to section 50-i which should color the
meaning of event and determine fixation of the accident in Klein.
C. The Meaning of Accident
Accident is not defined in section 50-i itself or in the studies
and case law interpreting the statute. "The multifaceted term 'ac-
cident' is not given a narrow, technical definition by the law. It is
construed, rather, in accordance with its understanding by the av-
erage man." 1 In common parlance, accident connotes an unex-
pected, sudden and often violent event.2 A layman asked to fix the
accident in Klein would probably say the fire; since the law reflects
the average man's perception, that is where a court should fix the
accident as well.
An accident often involves an almost simultaneous connection
between a negligent act and injury, as in a car crash, or spilling a
glass of milk. In a case of delayed injury-for example, a roller
skate left on a stair, which causes an injury the next day-there
still would be no accident, in common usage until the injury.63 In
61. Miller v. Continental Insurance Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 676, 358 N.E. 2d 258, 259, 389
N.Y.S.2d 258 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J.).
62. In its most commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary or popular sense,
the word may be defined as meaning: a fortuitous circumstance, event or hap-
pening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly
or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
ususual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens... some sudden
and unexpected event taking place without expectation, upon the instant, rather
than something which continues, progresses or develops ... the word may be
employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable
or unfortunate happening ... an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (5th ed. 1979); see Nallan v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 42
N.Y.2d 884, 366 N.E.2d 874, 397 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1977), citing Black's definition with
approval.
63. Cf. Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578, aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 900, 451
N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980), (in which plaintiff alleged she fell on a wet, defectively
designed laundry room floor. Her negligence action against the architect accrued when "the
invasion of plaintiff's rights occurred, i.e., when she fell as a result of the defendant's
claimed negligence."). Cf. Sexstone v. City of Rochester, 32 A.D.2d 737, 301 N.Y.S.2d 887




Klein there was no accident until plaintiff was damaged by the
fire; like the roller skate on a stair, Klein is an example of "an
accident waiting to happen." Any attempt to describe the issuance
of the certificate as an accident would ignore the everyday mean-
ing, and hence the legal meaning, of the term.
IV. THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 50-i
Having examined section 50-i's text and legislative history (its
immediate context), the next step is to fit the statute into a "going
system of law,"'" its broader context. In terms of the diagramming
metaphor, Klein is located at a point where the diagram of section
50-i meets the diagrams of other statutes and common law
precepts. An interpretation of a procedural rule, especially a stat-
ute of limitations, will often have profound impact upon substan-
tive law. This Article will therefore examine Klein's effect upon
established rights and duties to see how section 50-i connects with
its surroundings."
What is Klein's impact upon the rights of the plaintiff? As
noted, a purchaser of an apartment building has a right to rely
upon the certificate of occupancy issued by a municipality to a pre-
vious owner."' Since the plaintiff was precluded from suing the city
even before he bought the property, he unknowingly bought at his
peril-caveat emptor-and his right to rely upon the certificate
was rendered worthless. Multiple Residence Law section 302, sub-
division 5, makes the certificate of occupancy a warranty from the
municipality to a purchaser that the property meets the require-
ments that were checked during inspection. The practical effect of
Klein is that a purchaser of an apartment building will only be
able to rely upon an earlier certificate if he purchases the property
within one year and ninety days of its issuance, and the right will
expire when that period ends.
Such a result seriously abridges and nearly nullifies the right
64. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 374 (1960). Context will be used in
the sense suggested by Professor Llewellyn viz. as part of a legal setting, as opposed to
Professor Dickerson's meaning, as part of a general cultural setting. See R. DICKERSON, TnE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 105 (1975).
65. To borrow an analogy from Judge Frank, section 50-i and other statutes each play
their own melody and must be harmonized. J. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. R.v. 1259 (1947).
66. N.Y. MuLT. REsID. LAW § 302, subd. 5 (McKinney's 1951).
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created by Multiple Residence Law section 302, subdivision 5. A
"statute designed to protect a particular class 'is to be construed as
liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was thus framed.' ,,67 Instead of liberally construing subdi-
vision 5, the court substantially repealed it. Perhaps the plaintiff's
right to rely on the certificate is not totally within the municipal-
ity's needs for prompt investigation of a claim, and one or both
interests must give some ground.6 8 The court's opinion contains no
such balancing, however, and absent such a discussion section 50-i
cannot be satisfactorily joined with section 302, subdivision 5.
A. Constitutional Considerations
Klein must also be fit into the requirements of the United
States and New York State constitutions. Does the limitation upon
plaintiff's right to rely on the certificate violate his rights to either
equal protection or due process of law? 9 Other jurisdictions have
held restrictive notice of such claim provisions unconstitutional on
the ground that a plaintiff has a "natural and inherent right. . . to
prosecute a claim," and that any limitation upon that right must
be "reasonable and fair to all concerned."70 It could be argued that
by cutting off plaintiff's right to bring an action before he was in-
jured or owned the property, the state was neither "reasonable and
fair" nor constitutionally justified.
Such reasoning regarding notices of claim has, however, been
rejected in New York. In Matter of Brown v. Board of Trustees,
71
67. Dashinsky v. Santjer, 32 A.D.2d 382, 387, 301 N.Y.S.2d 876, 883 (2d Dep't 1969),
quoting Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, 129 N.Y.S. 170 (1912).
68. The law of torts is essentially a judicial balancing of interests. United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (1943), afl'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1944) (L. Hand, J.), cited in
Frank, supra note 65, at 1266.
69. U.S. CONST. AmEND. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part, "No State shall... de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
N.Y.S. Const. Art. 1, § 6 provides in part, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." Art. 1, § 11 provides in part, "No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."
70. O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504, 508 (1977); see Reich v. State High-
way Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d
879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School &
School District No. 403, 85 Wn. 2d 810, 1539 P.2d 845 (1975); cf. Ziecker v. Town of
Orchard Park, 70 A.D.2d 422, 425, 421 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 957, 416
N.E.2d 1055, 435 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1980).
71. 303 N.Y. 484, 112 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1952).
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General Municipal Law section 50-e's notice provision was found
constitutional on the ground that there was no right to sue a mu-
nicipality at common law, and, therefore, the legislature could re-
strict that right as it chose. This same rationale could be applied to
justify Klein; that the legislature acting through the court can re-
strict the right to sue a municipality under section 50-i as it sees
fit.72 Further, plaintiff's right to rely on the certificate, like his
right to sue the city, did not exist at common law. Therefore, any
restriction on that right, however harsh, does not rise to a level of
constitutional magnitude.
B. Tort Analysis
Since the plaintiff alleged the city had been negligent, Klein
must also be fit into established principles of tort theory. The ele-
ments of a negligence cause of action are: a duty of care, breach of
duty, causation, and injury."3 The city owed plaintiff a duty74 to
use reasonable care75 in its inspection of the building and issuance
of the certificate when he purchased the property in 1969.
The case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,76 established the
now-familiar rule that no duty is owed anyone until he steps into
the "orbit of danger"7 7 and injury to him becomes foreseeable. To
illustrate this rule the court used the example of a man driving a
car recklessly down a city street, who owed a duty to people
72. Cf. Pausley v. Chaloner, 54 A.D.2d 131, 133, 388 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (3d Dep't 1975),
app. dism., 41 N.Y.2d 900 (which followed Brown and rejected cases, e.g., cases cited at note
70 supra, which have struck down notice of claim requirements).
See also Glamm v. City of Amsterdam, 67 A.D.2d 1056, 413 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dep't 1979).
which cited Pausley in rejecting a due process objection to dismissal of a late notice claim.
73. W. PROSSER, ToRTs 143 (4th ed., 1971); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1965).
74. This duty, imposed by N.Y. MULT. REsID. LAW § 302, subd. 5 (McKinney's 1951),
can be compared to the common law duty owed by someone who contracts to perform a
service to third parties who can be expected to rely upon that service. Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 182 N.Y.S. 178 (1922) (Cardozo, J.); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 324 A (1965). Duties in tort can be imposed by the common law, statutes, or can arise
from contracts. Seavey, Principles of Torts, in LANDMARKS OF LAW 380 (Henson, ed. 1960),
originally published in 56 HARe. L. REV. 72 (1942).
75. Gordon v. Holt, 65 A.D.2d 344, 350, 412 N.Y.S.2d 534, 538 (4th Dep't 1979), leave
to appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 710; see Sexstone v. City of Rochester, 32 A.D.2d 737, 301
N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dep't 1969).
76. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 248 N.Y.S. 339, (1928) (Cardozo,
C.J.).
77. Id. at 343.
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"within the range of apprehension. 7 8 To borrow that analogy, no
duty was owed the plaintiff in Klein until injury to him could be
apprehended-when he stepped into the "orbit of danger" by
purchasing the building. When the certificate was issued plaintiff
was not even on the street. "Negligence ... is ... a term of rela-
tion,"7 9 and the city had no relation with plaintiff until he bought
the building.
A person's liability for his actions traditionally has been lim-
ited by such concepts as foreseeability and proximate cause.80
Dean Prosser believes these limitations boil down to a requirement
that an injury not be too "cockeyed" or "far-fetched."81 The in-
jury in Klein was not cockeyed; building defects which the city
failed to notice allegedly allowed a subsequent fire to spread more
quickly and do more damage. What separates the fire from the is-
suance of the certificate is not an attenuated sequence of events,
but time, and the passage of years alone will not diminish a duty
or absolve a liability.'
Plaintiff sustained two injuries as a result of the city's alleged
negligence. First, when he bought the property the building alleg-
edly contained defective firestops and did not conform to the
plans. If plaintiff had brought an action at that time, his only dam-
ages would have been the expense of rectifying these defects.
The city's alleged negligence also produced a second, more se-
rious injury which literally consumed the first-the fire. "Though
negligence may endanger the person or property of another, no ac-
tionable wrong is committed if the danger is averted. It is only the
injury to person or property arising from negligence which consti-
78. Id. A similar example was used in the dissent of Andrews, J., id at 349.
79. Id. at 345.
80. These factors along with others such as "the last human wrongdoer" and "natural
and probable consequences .... do not and cannot provide a satisfactory solution. There is
no substitute for dealing with the particular facts, and considering all the factors that bear
on them." Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 32 (1953).
81. Id. at 27. The determination of proximate cause and scope of duty are essentially
the same questions. W. PRossER, TORTs 244-45 (4th ed., 1971); see L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAusE 11-43 (1927).
82. See Seavey, supra note 74, at 393, where it is stated:
The fact that there is a long space of time or series of events intervening be-
tween the negligent act and the harm does not prevent liability. Thus, one who
negligently leaves an explosive where it is likely to harm third persons may be
liable for an explosion occurring several years later.
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tutes an invasion of personal right, protected by law, and therefore
an actionable wrong."83 When the fire occurred the plaintiff sus-
tained a new injury stemming from the original attachment and
breach of duty. A "negligent act may cause more than one injury
and thereby give rise to more than one cause of action. ' 84 The
wrong for which plaintiff sought recovery was not complete and
did not occur until the fire.8 5 He was barred from bringing an ac-
tion in tort before that tort even existed.8 6
C. Problems of Justice
Klein's holding thus puts a plaintiff in an untenable position.
As Professor Siegel has pointed out, the lesson of Klein may be to
"warn buyers not to wait for the fire: sue in advance of it and ap-
peal to a jury's imagination for damages. '87 The computation of
section 50-i's period from the issuance of the certificate means
"that plaintiff's cause of action was time barred years before he
became the owner of the apartment building, years before the fire
occurred, and that the cause of action existed only at a time when
plaintiff did not have any standing to bring it. ''"s
83. Schmidt v. Merchants Desp. Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 827
(1936). See also Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 235, 177 N.E. 431, 432 (1931) ("In ac-
tions of negligence damage is of the very gist and essence of the plaintiff's cause"); and
Seavey, supra note 74, at 378 ("harm is the tort signature").
84. Durant v. Grange Silo Co., 12 A.D.2d 694, 695, 207 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (3d Dep't
1960). In Durant a silo sustained leaking and crumbling of concrete blocks, and several
years later entirely collapsed. Plaintiff owner sued the builder for damages from the col-
lapse. The complaint's negligence cause of action was held timely, as the court rejected de-
fendant's argument that the claim accrued when the silo started leaking. "There is no rela-
tionship between the injuries except that they may have been caused by the same negligent
act." Id.
85. Cf. Boland v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 337, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972) (in which the limitation
period on a claim for wrongful confinement in a mental hospital did not start running until
the wrong was "complete," when plaintiff was released. "The 'complete wrong' rule was cre-
ated and applied to save a just claim and to recognize that ordinarily, but not invariably,
one sues when one's damages are ascertained to be complete and calculable."). Id. at 341-42.
86. The City of Yonkers in its brief at the Court of Appeals argued: "It was at [the time
the certificate of occupancy was issued] that respondent failed to assure compliance with its
fire code regulations. Further damage may flow from that wrongful event, however slight or
unnoticed at the time of its commission, but the tort, once committed, does not continue."
Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 11. The fundamental flaw in this argument is that there
was no negligence in relation to plaintiff, and hence no tort, when the city issued the
certificate.
87. N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Oct. 1981, at 4 (D. Siegel, ed.).
88. Klein v. City of Yonkers, No. 75-10586 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County, Feb. 13,
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It seems grossly unfair, an "absurd result,"89 that a plaintiff
who diligently brings an action after a fire should find not only
that he is too late, but that he could not have recovered had he
brought the action earlier. As former Chief Judge Breitel observed
in his dissent in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.:
[I]t is all but unthinkable that a person should be time barred from prosecut-
ing a cause of action before he ever had one. In those torts which give rise to
a cause of action even without or before palpable damage, the limitations run
from the commission of the wrong but there is also instanter a cause of action
accrued as in libel, trespass and the like."
Dean Pound has noted, "the law enforces the reasonable expecta-
tions arising out of conduct, relations and situations." 1 The prob-
lem with Mendel and now Klein is that neither case enforces the
reasonable expectations of people. "It is the customary morality of
right-minded men and women which [the judge] is to enforce by
his decree." 92 The average "right-minded person" would conclude
that by giving plaintiff a right to rely on the certificate, and then
cutting off his right to sue before he even purchased the property,
the state lulled him into a false sense of security, created an fi1u-
1979).
89. Klein, 53 N.Y.2d at 1017, 425 N.E.2d at 868, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id., quoting Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346-47, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969) (Breitel, J., dissenting). In Mendel, the plaintiff alleged injury
caused by a glass door. The court held the statute of limitations on her cause of action for
strict liability in tort ran from the date of the door's sale, not plaintiff's injury. Therefore,
plaintiff's cause of action was time barred before she was injured. Mendel was overruled by
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1976), and later criticized by the Court of Appeals as an "all but inconceivable result."
Martin v. Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 590, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188
(1978). The illogic of such an outcome was also observed by the dissenting judge in a Second
Circuit opinion:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be di-
vorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a
house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For sub-
stantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of
logical 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause
of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is avail-
able to the plaintiff.
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting).
91. R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 189 (1st. ed. 1922), cited in
Cardozo, Growth of the Law, in SE.LECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo (Hall,
ed. 1947) [hereinafter SELECTED WRTINGs].
92. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 91,
at 151.
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sory right, and did not do him justice.
Klein is not the only case to suffer such problems; Cota13 and
Erickson94 similarly precluded plaintiffs from suing before they
had a cause of action. However, Erickson's result has been eased
by the recent wrongful death amendments, 95 and Cota cannot be
repeated since there is no longer a $500 no-fault threshold.95 More
importantly, the harsh results in Cota and Erickson were reached
by computing the year and ninety days from the date of the acci-
dent, as the legislature intended, while Klein's harsh result was
reached by commencing that period before the accident, thereby
violating the legislative intent.
V. THE KLEIN COURT'S RATIONALE
The court's decision in Klein was based upon its conclusion
that "[s]ince Erickson, courts have uniformly concluded that the
limitation period begins to run upon the happening of the event,
irrespective of when the action accrued. '9 7 The court thereby im-
plied that its choice was between starting the period at an earlier
"event," the issuance of the certificate, or at a later accrual, the
fire. However, Klein was not a case like Cota of an accident and
later accrual, but a case of a negligent act and later injury. The
reliance upon Cota appears misplaced given the dissimilarity in the
facts; Klein's accident was the second, not the first step. Further,
the court in Klein did not mention Cota's explicit language that
the limitation period commences on the date of the accident, 8 a
statement which directly supports the dissent's position.
The majority also cited Doyle v. 800, Inc.,99 in which a certifi-
cate of occupancy was revoked when a house began to settle. Re-
pairs were made and a new certificate was issued. Plaintiffs al-
leged that two years later they discovered the house was sinking
again, but their action for a defective certificate was time barred
93. See note* 39 supra.
94. See note 43 supra.
95. See note 49 supra.
96. INSURANCE LAW § 671, subd. 4(b) has since been revised to eliminate the $500
threshold and to change the definition of a serious injury. L. 1977, ch. 892, § 8.
97. 53 N.Y.2d at 1013, citing Cota v. Madison Central School Dist., 89 Misc. 2d 646,
392 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1977), afl'd, 62 A.D.2d 1083, 404 N.Y.S.2d 547 (3d Dep't 1978), and Phil-
lips v. Waterford, 48 A.D.2d 745, 368 N.Y.S.2d 77 (3d Dep't 1975).
98. 89 Misc. 2d at 648.
99. 72 A.D.2d 761, 421 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1979).
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"albeit the fact that plaintiffs were unaware of the damages about
to befall them."100
It is not clear exactly why the Doyle court commenced the
limitation period upon the issuance of the certificate. Perhaps the
court believed the "event," the issuance of the certificate, was the
negligent act. Since "event" means accident,10' and requires a neg-
ligent act plus injury, such a basis would be erroneous. Perhaps the
court assumed that the settling commenced on the date the new
certificate was issued. No such assumption, finding, or proof
thereof is discussed in the opinion.
Even apart from these problems, Doyle has limited applicabil-
ity here. The plaintiff in Doyle alleged one injury, the settling,
which apparently started when the certificate was issued. The
plaintiff in Klein alleged a second injury caused by the city's negli-
gence, the fire, which did not occur until years later. Doyle would
be more applicable if it involved a second injury, e.g., if the settling
of the house caused a gas line to break, starting a fire. Further,
Doyle was a "discovery" case'0 while Klein involved an accident
waiting to happen, l0 3 not an accident waiting to be revealed.
VI. THE UNEXPRESSED RATIONALE
Insight into a judicial opinion can sometimes be achieved by
reading between the lines as well as upon them.'10 Some "sources
100. 72 A.D.2d at 762, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
101. See legislative history discussion at notes 33-39 and 60-62 and accompanying text
supra.
102. 72 A.D.2d at 762, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
103. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
104. Professor Llewellyn tells of his law school frustration in former President Taft's
Constitutional Law class. After a case was discussed, Professor Taft would brush aside the
court's expressed rationale with anecdotes of his experience in public life:
Whether this came out of his notebook, we never knew; but Taft imparted to us
by his manner his own clear feeling that this was no part of 'the law' or, really,
of 'the course'. . . . From time to time, instead of just giving an illustration or
two of what the court's announced rationale covered, he would produce an intel-
lectual scalpel and slice the court's phrased ruling down into an almost nothing.
You then got, with another half-ton chuckle: 'Mr. Justice Zilch sometimes let
enthusiasm run away with him.'
LLEWELLYN, supra note 64, at 21-22.
Judge Breitel on the other hand believes a court should express the real basis of its
opinion. "As between a court being influenced by a factor and pretending it is not, and
being influenced by a factor, admitting it, and being bound to evaluate it rationally, the
choice should be with the latter." Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 6, at 33.
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of tort law can not be found in judicial language and can be under-
stood only by a 'search for unarticulated premises of decisions.' "10
Was the court in Klein swayed by a factor which it did not
discuss?
Klein's holding bears a striking resemblance to a series of New
York cases which have involved injuries allegedly caused by the
ingestion of foreign substances into the body, discovered years af-
ter the last exposure. In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans-
port Co.,106 plaintiff alleged he inhaled dust at work which later
caused him to contract pneumoconiosis. In Schwartz v. Heyden
Newport Chemical Corp.,107 plaintiff alleged the product "um-
brathor" was injected into his sinuses to make them more visible
during an x-ray series; the drug caused a carcinoma and plaintiff's
eye was removed thirteen years later. In Thornton v. Roosevelt
Hospital,°10  plaintiff was injected with thorium dioxide during si-
nus x-rays and later contracted cancer. Most recently in Stein-
hardt v. Johns-Manville Corp.,09 plaintiff executrix alleged the
deceased had developed respiratory ailments, and finally died from
mesothelioma (an asbestos related cancer) as a result of working
with asbestos products.
In each case the Court of Appeals found the cause of action
for negligence accrued when the injured party was last exposed to
the foreign material, not when he discovered his injury.110 The
105. P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 775 (1977
ed.), quoted in G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 217 (1980).
106. 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
107. 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
108. 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
109. 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981).
110. The rationale of these cases has been strongly criticized. See dissent of Desmond,
J., in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Co., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1963); dissent of Fuchsberg, J. in Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital, 47 N.Y.2d 780, 417
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); dissent of Fuchsberg, J. in Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54
N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981). Professor Siegel believes the "best
that can be said" about Schmidt's holding is that it is "unrealistic." D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 40 (1978). Steinhardt has been criticized as a case in which the court:
reaffirmed its earlier adherence to the anachronistic 'exposure theory' for statute
of limitations purposes, thus leaving New York as one of the few states in a
constantly dwindling minority of less than a dozen which are willing to foreclose
a plaintiff's right to sue even though he has not experienced any disability, has
not been medically diagnosed as having any disease, and does not even know he
has been injured. To adopt such a limiting view of the law ranks as a tragedy not
only for the thousands of victims who have been barred from any recovery but
also for the State of New York which once prided itself as being in the forefront
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court assumed the substances involved cause immediate injury.
upon contact. This assumption obviated the possibility of consider-
ing these as cases of delayed injury instead of delayed discovery.
The court declined to extend the discovery rule on the ground that
the legislature was the proper body to make such a change.""'
The Klein court reached a similar result with similar logic.
Both the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals relied upon
Doyle v. 800, Inc.,1 2 which characterized its facts as a discovery
case. By implicitly assuming that the issuance of the certificate
somehow affected the plaintiff, just as the dust in Schmidt some-
how affected the worker, the court was able to treat the plaintiff as
if he had actually been injured when the certificate was issued, and
merely "discovered" it ten years later.1 The conclusion in Klein is
also the same as the conclusion in Thornton and Steinhardt: any
change is for the legislature, not the court to make."1 4 In sum, the
heart of Klein, may be an unexpressed discovery rationale, reflect-
ing the restrictive holdings which have followed from Schmidt,n 5
with a similar shifting of responsibility to the legislature.1 "
Klein might also be based upon a belief that the legislature
intended section 50-i to be applied narrowly. The Law Revision
Commission's proposal to liberalize the wrongful death provisions
was originally made in 1979 and did not pass until after Klein had
been decided.1117 The court could have construed the legislature's
of safeguarding the rights of citizens and workers.
Levy, Setback for Victims in New York Courts, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
111. See Schmidt, 270 N.Y. at 299, 200 N.E.2d at 826; Schwartz, 12 N.Y.2d at 219, 188
N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Thornton, 47 N.Y.2d at 782, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 921; Steinhardt, 54 N.Y.2d at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
112. 72 A.D.2d 761, 421 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1979). See text accompanying notes 99-101
supra.
113. Cf. text accompanying notes 102-103 supra; Klein is not a discovery case.
114. Thornton, 47 N.Y.2d at 782; Steinhardt, 54 N.Y.2d at 1008.
115. Cf. McGrath v. Board of Educ., 47 N.Y.2d 843, 418 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1979), which
relied upon Schwartz and Thornton in dismissing late notices of claim, and rejecting an
argument that the claims accrued upon discovery.
116. In Thornton's deferral to the legislature Professor Siegel sees "a plain indication
of the judiciary's apprehensions about linking cause and effect over so long a period. While
it is true that the linking is ordinarily an issue of fact, and ordinarily appropriate for a court
to resolve, the Court of Appeals apparently takes the position that the expertise needed to
make the connection should be the work of many minds in a broad based program for which
the Legislature alone is equipped." D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACrICE § 40 at 6 (Supp. 1980).
This same apprehension is evident in Klein.
117. Klein was decided on June 9, 1981. The wrongful death amendments (L. 1981, c.
738 § 2) were not approved by the Governor until July 27, 198i.
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failure to pass this amendment as of the decision date as a desire
to protect municipalities and limit their liability.18 This restrictive
policy could have been supported by a belief that in most cases a
multiple dwelling owner will have insurance, leaving the court a
choice between placing the loss on the insurance carrier or the mu-
nicipality.11 9 A protectionist policy would then be applied, not at
the expense of a single citizen, but at the expense of a business
which could adjust its fees accordingly to cover the loss. The equi-
table choice then is not so difficult. In any event the presence of
insurance is more properly a consideration for the legislature in
determining whether to revise the extent of. a property owner's
right to rely on a certificate of occupancy.
VII. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
General Municipal Law section 50-i, subdivision 1 should be
amended so that the last phrase in the subdivision, clause (c) reads
as follows:
(c) the action or special proceeding shall be commenced within
one year and ninety days after the [happening of the event upon
which the claim is based] claim arises; except that wrongful death
actions shall be commenced within two years after the happening
of the death. [Deletions in brackets, additions in italics].
The phrase "happening of the event upon which the claim is
based" is eliminated because it is unclear and ambiguous. "[C]laim
arises" is substituted to conform section 50-i with section 50-e, 20
and to make the starting points for the notice of claim and com-
mencement of an action periods the same.1 21 This revision would
eliminate cases where notice is timely but the time for commencing
118. However, equating legislative silence with affirmative intent is, at best, a "hazard-
ous enterprise," since a legislature may fail to act "for reasons having no relation to its
intent regarding the substance of the issue in question." Note, Intent, Clear Statements,
and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REV.
892, 906 n.98.
119. The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals opinions in Klein do not indicate
whether plaintiff had insurance. Klein was, in fact, a subrogation case (telephone call to
plaintiff's counsel, February 24, 1982).
120. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e, subd. (a) provides in part: "In any case founded upon
tort where a notice of claim is required ... the notice of claim shall ... be served ...
within ninety days after the claim arises ......
121. The Joint Legislative Committee apparently intended that both periods should
commence at the same point. See note 39 supra. See also Sexstone v. City of Rochester, 32
A.D.2d 737, 301 N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dep't 1969).
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an action has already run, which was the anomalous result in
Klein. Also, when the "claim arises" is a phrase with an estab-
lished legal meaning-the accrual of the claim 122-and the body of
case law construing it could simply be applied to section 50-i. 12 3
This revision may increase the liability of municipalities in
cases of delayed injury. However, such occurrences should be
rare, 24 and liability will be checked in cases like Klein by the
amendments proposed infra. The alternative is to compute the
statutory period before the claim arises, which obviously protects
municipalities, but at the expense of public confidence in the fair-
ness of the law. A more even balance is needed.
Multiple Residence Law section 302, subdivision 5 should be
amended as follows:
A certificate, a record in a department, or a statement signed by the head of
the department that a certificate has been issued, may be relied upon for a
period of five years from the date the certificate is issued, by every person
who in good faith purchases a multiple dwelling or who in good faith lends
money upon the security of a mortgage covering such a dwelling. A claim
which arises more than five years from the date the certificate is issued can-
not be the basis for a recovery under this subdivision. Whenever any person
has so relied upon such a certificate, no claim that such dwelling had not,
prior to the issuance of such certificate, conformed in all respects to the pro-
visions of this chapter shall be made against such person or his successor in
title or ownership with respect to such multiple dwelling or mortgage, or
against the interest of any such person with respect thereto.
In its present form, this section gives a purchaser or mortgagee
of a multiple residence a right to rely on a certificate that is not
limited in time. Klein's application of section 50-i imposes a one
year and ninety-day limit on that right without notice to the pur-
chaser. Subdivision 5 needs to be altered to accomodate section 50-
122. See Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1977); Bloomfield Building Wreckers, Inc. v. City of Troy, 50 A.D.2d 673, 375
N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1102, 364 N.E.2d 1130, 396 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1977); Bor-
gia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962); P. Gra-
ziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and Re-
lated Statutes, 21 N.Y. JuniciAL CONF. ANN. REP. 358, 380-83 (1976).
123. The commencement of section 50-i's period upon the accident is not proposed be-
cause "accident," while colorful, is a term of general rather than precise legal usage. Section
50-i covers both negligent and intentional torts, while accident generally refers to negli-
gence; the term is not broad enough for the space in the statute.
124. The Law Revision Commission reached a similar conclusion regarding delayed




i, and to balance a purchaser's right of reliance against a munici-
pality's need for timely investigation. An explicit limit of five
years limits a municipality's exposure to actions based on such re-
liance, yet still affords a purchaser fair notice of exactly what his
right entails.
CONCLUSION
The many ways in which Klein can be examined-from its
faithfulness to the legislative intent, to the logic of tort theory, to
the perceptions of the man on the street-engender a final feeling
that the plaintiff was cheated of his day in court. The legislature
should remove a grey phrase from section 50-i and start the limita-
tion period when the claim arises, as in section 50-e. The need for
uniformity still exists. Without such correction the harshness of
Schmidt and its progeny will be extended into an area that the
legislature never contemplated, and a multiple dwelling pur-
chaser's right to rely on a certificate of occupancy will remain in
procedural limbo.
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